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Democratic Dreams
Richard M. Valelly
The Death of An American Jewish
Community: A Tragedy of Good
Intentions
Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon

Tbe Free Press, $24.95

e aring de e r chimes but
not exp ecting visitors,
Rabbi Gerald Zelermyer
o f so uthe rn Mattapan's
Te mple Beth Hillel in
Boston opened the door of the temple's
parsonage late one afternoon on June 27,
1969. He had just come home from a day
of meetings with concerned AfricanAmerican and white clergy from the Mattapan and Dorchester areas of Boston.
The topic of their diS(:ussion was panic
selling by whites in response to fears of
minority influx. Standing in front of the
28 year-old rabbi were two young men,
both black. One thrust a note toward the
rabbi, who held it long enough to make
out the words, "lead the Jewish racists
out of Mattapan." Suddenly, the other
threw acid into the rabbi's face. Had
Rabbi Zelermyer not turned his face he
would have been blinded for life.
Preparing for the next Sabbath in great
physical and emotional pain, Rabbi Zelermyer wondered how Temple Beth Hillel would survive. The acid thrown in his
face was a strike against the 300 families
in the congregation and against their 5day-a-week Hebrew school; the last such
school in Boston, it served 125 children.
He even speculated that real estate
agents profiting from the panic selling
had put his assailants up to the job.
Rabbi Zelermyer had been sucked
into the violence surrounding neighborhood change in Roxbury, Mattapan, and
Dorchester. That change began in the
1950s with the departure from Boston of
a number of major, longstanding Jewish
institutions. Temple Mishkan Tefila relocated from Roxbury, where it had been
since 1925, to Newton. Hebrew Teacher's
College moved to Brookline. An urban
community that once numbered 82,000
in the 1940s shrank to about 53,000 by
the 1950s and by the late 1960s was
probably no larger than about 17,000. In
the process the level of municipal services in Roxbury, Mattapan, and Dorchester dropped, intersecting a rising level
of crime.
But many Jews remained in Mattapan
(the precise numbers are a matter of controversy). And many who stayed hoped
to build a special kind of Jewish community, a community based on black-Jewish
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fraternity. They banded together to form
the Mattapan Organization, a neighborhood association that sought to counter
the panic selling encouraged by "blockbusting" real estate agents who profited
from racial conflict. A local Catholic priest
and his parishioners helped as well. Both
of the main partners in the alliance, Jews
a nd blacks, sought decent houses and
neighborhoods, both knew intimately the
d ark side of exclusion, many in each
g roup recognized their common interests. Rabbi Zelermyer's guidance would
have been a key part of a neighborhood
democracy.
But by 1969 this experiment in
democracy was doomed. Local schools
were in utter disarray. Crime continued
to rise. And the conviction was growing
a mong the remaining Jewish residents
that the time had come to cut losses and
leave. Even before the attack on Rabbi
Zelermyer the board of Temple Beth Hillel had secretly sold the temple to the
City of Boston. By 1973 the painful displacement of the remaining, often elderly
Jewish residents came to a close.
What can be said about such a sad
story? That social change inevitably trigg ered black-Jewish tension? That the
democratic dreams of Rabbi Zelermyer
a nd the Mattapan Organization could
never have worked? That people who are
really different from each other can never
share a neighborhood?
Democracy and the possibilities of fraternity should not be written off so quickly. That's the underlying message of The
Death of an American jewish Community, a poignant study of the demise of the
Jewish community in Roxbury, Mattapan,
and Dorchester by Hillel Levine, a Boston
University sociologist, and Lawrence Harmon, former managing editor of the jewish Advocate. Levine and Harmon devote
considerable attention to criticizing mainstream Jewish leadership for running the
government of Judaism undemocratically,
and in the process betraying the Jews of
M attapan and Dorchester. But a key
strength of their book lies beyond this
critique. As Levine and Harmon tell their
story, it becomes clear that things might
have worked out differently and better.
A nd that hopeful suggestion carries
important lessons for us now.
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City Councilor Thomas Atkins convinced Kevin White that tensions
would escalate if the city cancelled a James Brown rock concert
scheduled for the day after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.
n the side of hope was the
historic promise of the blackJewish coalition. Founded in
a mutual knowledge - and
an egalitarian hatred - of political,
social, and economic exclusion, the
black-Jewish coalition has always symbolized democratic fraternity . Rabbis
marched with Dr. King in Selma in 1965.
Even today, the coalition continues to
play a key political role in places as different as New York City and Louisiana.
Had the Mattapan Organization and its
black allies succeeded, they could have
shown how to make an integrated city
neighborhood work while maintaining
religious and ethnic diversity. To know
what that success might have looked like,
we need a good deal more information
about the black side of the story in Mattapan and Dorchester. Here Levine and
Harmon are, unfortunately, largely silent.
They picture black rage and black
teenage crime as if those responses
exhausted black involvement in the history they describe. They offer quick portraits of Tom Atkins, Paul Parks, and
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others, but ·their treatment of the black
c ommunity has none of the depth and
i nsight of their characterization of the
Jewish community. Indeed, they hardly
recognize it as a community. A second
study, from the black side of the process,
is waiting to be written.
Levine and Harmon are more successful, however, in their description of the
pressures that helped to kill the ideal of
inter-racial, neighborhood democracy.
The first pressure arose, ironically,
f rom the government of Boston-area
Judaism, for which Levine and Harmon
have scathing criticism. Government by
m akhers, say the authors, lacks internal
democracy, accountability, and debate.
Their critique has not gone unmet - it
w as the centerpiece of the spirited ,
instructive exchange in the jewish Advoc ate (March 27 - April 2, April 10 - 16,
a nd May 1-7, 1992) between the authors
and Gerald Gamm, an accomplished student of Boston social and political history
w ho teaches at the University of
R ochester. Gamm suggests that the
nature of Jewish institutions determined
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the leadership's behavior and the continuity of Jewish community through social
change.
Still, Levine and Harmon insist, there
were limits on the capacities of mainstream leadership to represent the aspirations of urban, working and
middle-class Jews who cherished their
neighborhoods. Heads of philanthropies
and many others could have helped the

The second source
of pressure came
from bankers and
other wealthy
Boston·elites.
working and middle-class Jews of Mattapan and Dorchester. But they did too little too late. According to Levine and
Harmon, the roots of that failure lay in a
combination of class bias, a fixation on
the glories of the civil rights movement,
a shallow optimism about the happy
inevitability of suburbanization, and a
belief that they knew best how to protect the Jewish community in a hostile
world.
The second source of pressure came
from bankers and other wealthy Boston
elites . The analysis of the role played
by these elites focuses on a private, federally-backed mortgage program.
Announced in 1968, in the wake of Martin Luther King's assassination, the program was put together by B-BURG, the
Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group.
Levine and Harmon provide telling
details about the people who established
such organizations as B-BURG and The
Vault, Boston's private business round
table. While portraying themselves as
statesmanlike emissaries from the private
sector to a helpless public sector, they in
fact come across as flawed, even narrow
people. There were, of course, men and
women of good will who sincerely
believed that they were creatively solving social problems and adjusting conflict. But their capacity to address social
ills was fatally undermined by their resistance to public accountability.
In response to private complaints, BBURG made clear its wish for complete
autonomy. So downtown bankers
enforced a flawed mortgage program
that was placed beyond democratic
scrutiny. B-BURG redlined money into a
small area of Boston, much of which
somehow happened to be Jewish. The
program in tum guaranteed blockbusting
by unscrupulous real estate agents, a
high rate of black bankruptcy (since no
money for improvements was put aside,
despite the deteriorated condition of the
housing stock), and a level of disorder
and crime that kept elderly Jews at
home, in terror. The responsible "city
fathers " in B-BURG turned a bundle off
this ersatz integration. They made much
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of their money from the federal government. The federal government - our
federal government - underwrote losses via lucrative guarantees from the Federal Housing Authority. And in the end,
ordinary people who happened to have
different color skins and who happened
to worship God differently suffered.
But who , exactly, placed B-BURG
beyond public scrutiny? Here we come
to the third obstacle to neighborhood
democracy : the role of professional
politicians in a basically conservative
Democratic party. Boston's politicians,
and their allies in the federal bureaucracy, prevented the intelligence of contentious, democratic politics from
working its effects. No policy is perfect
at inception, and each requires adjustment. But the absence of any debate
about the policy's design made such
adjustment impossible. In fact, the flaws
in the B-BURG program were not pointed out until Senator Philip Hart of Michigan conducted a hearing on it in 1971.
But by then it was simply too late.
Had there been political accountability - in short, had their been democracy
- the Mattapan Organization might
have survived. Others could have sprung
up to work with it, led by activists such
as Mel King (who briefly appears in the
book, but with little analysis of his program), or Michael Ansara, who led Fair
Share. The example of Fair Share is
instructive in this connection. Building
on the lessons of the limits of the BBURG program, Fair Share set in place
private limits to blockbusting in order to
protect other integrated Boston neighborhoods. The Mattapan Organization
and others could have played a similar
role in implementing the B-BURG program, monitoring its effectiveness, and
proposing improvements. But such roles
required the democratic responsiveness
that B-BURG insisted was impossible,
and which City Hall did nothing to create. The result, instead, was the com-

plete dissipation of the associational
energies which working and middleclass Jews and their black neighbors put
into the Mattapan Organization. Without
democracy, their fledgling commitments
to each other died amid "For Sale" signs
and daily crime.
In a 1987 interview with Levine and
Harmon, former Boston mayor Kevin
White speculated that pressure from the
mainstream Jewish leadership would
have given him the resources to proceed
with instituting accountability. Far better
that White and others had asked questions earlier. If a program like B-BURG's
federally insured mortgage program was
the quickest, most efficient way to meet
black housing needs in Boston, then was
it really necessary for B-BURG to have
complete discretion? If B-BURG required
federal guarantees, why couldn't politicians at the federal level -the Massachusetts congressional delegation, for
instance - have demanded strong, substantive accountability in return?
o alternative policies were possible. Ultimately, however, the
details of these alternatives are
less important than the recognition that racial and ethnic divisions are
simply not "natural" or inevitable, but are
instead the product of social and political
hierarchies. As such, those false social
divisions can be overcome by people
who genuinely care about democracy.
Levine and Harmon offer a critical book,
but it's not a complaining book. Instead it
argues - though not as fully as one
might like - that ethnic and racial fraternity are at once the cause and the consequence of democratic social policy.
Neighborhood democracy requires
very hard work - but there were people
who gave that kind of hard work. In a
more democratic society their struggle
just might have paid off. Next to the
story that Levine and Harmon tell, in
other words, is another story that could
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have been told. They write their book so
t hat the counterfactual story about the
realization of democratic possibilities is
always there, between the lines.
The actual history is truly tragic.
blacks got lousy housing, Jews got hurt,
t hough both wanted the same thing in
t he same place - a decent neighborh ood. The other story, of what could
have been, is encouraging. It is a vision
o f what America ought to be. We very
much need a comparable vision to guide
o ur national struggle both with the consequences of the growing political isolat ion of America's cities, and with the
obstacles to building a working democracy - togetheL W
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'Boston 1\._eview is pleased to
announce its first annual

Short Story Contest
The winning entry will be published
in the March 1993 issue of the Review
and will receive a cash prize of $300.
All entrants will receive the March
issue. The stories are not restricted by
subject matter, should not exceed
4000 words, and should be previously
unpublished. There is a $5.00 processing fee, payable to the Boston
Review in the form of check or money
order. The deadline for submissions is
January 31, 1993. Please address submissions to Short Story Contest.
Stories will not be returned. The
winner will be notified by mail.
Send your entry to:

Short Story Contest
'Boston 'Rf;view
33 Harrison Ave.
Boston, MA 02111
Tbe Review prides itself on judging
the quality of the work, not the name
or fame of the author.

''This series is the
best hope we have
for extending the
[poetry] audience."
·-Washington Post Book World

The fifth volume. in a series that has "taken its
place alongside America's most prestigious
annuals" (Cleveland Plain Deale() features
seventy-five poets, half of whom appear here
for the first time. In this year's edition, edited by
Pulitzer Prize-winner Charles Simic, young voices
are heard alongside those already well established
to show the broad range of talent for which the
series has been praised. With a foreword by
David Lehman, an introduction by Charles Simic,
and notes by the poets commenting on their work.
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Available in both trade paperback
and hardcover editions
At all bookstores or call 1-800-323-7445
to place your credit card order
COLLIER BOOKS • CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
Imprints of Macmillan Publishing Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022
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